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SenkakulDiaoyu: Are They Islands?
CONSTANTINOS YIALLOURIDES*

I.

Introduction

The Senkaku or Diaoyu islands, as they are respectively known to the
Japanese and the Chinese, (hereafter, "Senkaku/Diaoyu islands"), is a small
group of islands lying at the southwestern edge of the East China Sea. They
are approximately 120 nautical miles (nm) northeast of Taiwan, 200nm east
of China, and 200nm southwest of the Japanese island of Okinawa.2 They
are comprised of the Uotsurijima/Diaoyu Dao island, four other smaller
islets, and three barren rocks; their land amasses to just over six square
kilometers3 All of the islands are currently uninhabited. Interestingly, since
the 1970s, when China and Japan formally expressed their territorial claims
over the islands, these small, isolated, and uninhabited offshore features have
served as the most persistent and explosive bone of contention between the
two countries.4 The reason lies not in their economic value per se, as no
* Dr. Constantinos Yiallourides is a Teaching Associate at the University of Aberdeen,
School of Law. He holds a Ph.D. in International Law, an LL.M. in Oil and Gas Law (with
distinction), both from the University of Aberdeen, and an LL.B. from the Democritus
University of Thrace, Greece. Dr. Yiallourides is also a legal consultant in the energy/natural
resources sector and an associate counsel in commercial litigation (civil and common law). The
author would like to thank Professor Tina Hunter, Dr Roy Andrew Partain and Mr. Malcolm
Combe for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1. Tiaoyu is the Chinese name of the islands in the Latin alphabet. Its Chinese name is also
known as "Diaoyu Dao" or "Diao-yu tai." China calls the islands "Diaoyu Tai" or "Diaoyu
Dao". Taiwan uses the same Chinese characters but gives them a different spelling as "Tiao Yu
Ta"'. Japan calls the islands "Senkaku", "Senkaku Gunto' or "Sento Shosho". See Guoxing Ji,
The Diaoyudao (Senkaku) Disputes and Prospectsfor Settlement 6(2) KouEs J. OF DEF. ANALYsIs
285 (1994); see also Min G Koo, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-Japanese Political-Economic
Relations: Cold Politics and Hot Economics? 22(2) Ti PAC. REv. 205, 206 (2009).
2. CHOON-HO PAPlu, EAsT ASIA AND T- LAW OF THE SEA 32 (1983).
3. Masahiko Asada, Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, MAx PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
LAw Gune 2007), available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
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1690-e2015?rskey=MAYf0L&result=l&prd=EPIL.
9780199231690/1aw-97801
4. The historical and factual evidence advanced by interested states to support their
territorial tide in the disputed features has been widely examined in literature and falls beyond
the scope of this paper, which focuses exclusively on the aspects relevant to the law of the sea.
Suffice to say, at this point, China claims the islands on the basis of historic discovery and usage
dating back to the Ming Dynasty (AD 1368-1644). While Japan argues that it acquired the

islands as terra nullius, in 1895, as they were found to be unoccupied with no signs of formal
control. See Ji, supra note 1, for an analysis of the customary international law of territorial

acquisition and the historical facts of the dispute; Hitoshi Nasu and Donald R Rothwell, ReEvaluating the Role of International Law in Territorialand Maritime Disputes in East Asia 4(1)
AsiANJ. OF INT'L L. 55 (2014); Hungdah Chiu, An Analysis of the Sino-JapaneseDispute Over the
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economic activities are currently being conducted on the islands, but rather
on their strategic location near areas where substantial quantities of offshore
oil and gas are thought to be present.5
Under the framework of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and customary international law at large,
offshore features qualifying as islands, in a legal sense, can generate zones of
maritime jurisdiction in the same way as any other mainland territory. That
being the case, the suspected presence of vast hydrocarbon deposits in the
adjacent waters renders Senkaku/Diaoyu islands intrinsically valuable.6 The
significance attached to these islands stems from the perception that their
possession can potentially generate extensive areas of maritime jurisdiction
capturing the marine resources in the surrounding waters and seabed.7
Obviously, there is a close connection between the islands' maritime
generating capacity and the associated sovereign rights over resources
thereof.8
The possible effect of an island on maritime delimitation presupposes that
the island is capable of generating maritime projections to be delimited vis:1-vis other states with opposite or adjacent coasts.9 Accordingly, this paper
T'iaoyu Tai lets (Senkaku Gunto) 15 CHINESE Y.B. OF INT'L L. AFF. 9 (1996); Basic View on the
Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Nov. 9, 2012),
www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/position-paperen.html; Min G Koo, The Senkakul
Diaoyu Dispute and Sino-JapanesePolitical-EconomicRelations: Cold Politicsand Hot Economics? 22(2)
THE PAC. REv. 205, 213 (2009); JEANETTE GREENFIELD, CHINA'S PRACTICE IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA 127-129 (1992).
5. Geologists Emery and Niino first identified the perception that the East China Sea could
potentially be one of the most prolific oil regions in the world in 1961. Their report was largely
based on stratigraphic and oceanographic data gathered by Japanese and American submarines
during the Second World War. In 1968, a geological study funded by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), confirmed that the "continental
shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one of the most prolific oil reservoirs in the world" and
"one of the few large continental shelves in the world that has remained untested by the
drill,
owing to military aAd political factors." See K.O. Emery et al., Geological Structure and Some
Water Characteristicsof the East China and the Yellow Sea, 2 TECHNICAL BULLETIN OF THE
EcoNoA4ic COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND THiE FAR EAST 41 (Apr. 30, 1968).
6. RALF EMMERS, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CONTESTED TERRITORIES IN EAST ASIA
33 (2013); Sang-Myon Rhee & James MacAulay, Ocean Boundary Issues in EastAsia: The Need for
PracticalSolutions, in Ocean Boundary Making: Regional Issues and Developments 85-86
(1988).
7. Clive Schofield, The Trouble with Islands: The Definition and Role of Islands and Rocks in
Maritime Boundary Delimitation, in MARYtIME BouNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES,
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 21 (Seoung-Yong Hong & Jon M. Van Dyke eds., 2008).
8. This connection is amply illustrated in the words of some Japanese scholars who consider
that "the Senkaku Islands fill every condition for being qualified as islands from the viewpoint of
international law [hence] Japan has the sovereign right for the exploration of natural resources
on the continental shelf adjacent to the Senkaku Islands." Toshio Okuhara, The Territorial
Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and Problems on the Surrounding Continental Shelf 15
JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 95, 105 (1971).
9. "In giving special attention to the regime of islands the Convention reflects the
importance of islands in the delimitation of maritime space," UNrrED NATIONS CONVENT-ION
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examines whether the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands qualify as islands in
accordance with UNCLOS, and as a consequence, generate full maritime
zones, before evaluating the possible effect of these islands on maritime
boundary delimitation in the area in question. To that end, the relevant
provisions of UNCLOS are presented and analyzed with a moderate degree
of reference to literature, international jurisprudence and state practice.
II.

What is an "Island" in a Legal Sense?

UNCLOS only provides a single article on the regime of naturally
occurring islands.1o This indicates what geographic formations qualify as
"islands" in a legal sense, but also what geographic formations similar to
islands cannot be legally considered as such. It also provides for the equal
treatment of islands and other land territories for the purpose of delimiting
the territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and
continental shelf. Article 121 of UNCLOS reads as follows:
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the
contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks, which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own, shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf."
Paragraph 1 of the above Article has adopted, unchanged, Article 10 of the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958
Territorial Sea Convention).12 In defining an island as a "naturally formed
area of land," it excludes by definition artificial islands, which come under
the scope of Articles 11, 60, 80 and 147(2) of UNCLOS. Further, the
indispensable condition that an island must be "above water at high tide"
1982: A COlMlENTARY VOL. 3 325 (Myron Norquist et al. eds.,
1995).
10. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter "UNCLOS"), Dec. 10, 1982, Article
121, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
11. Id. (Article 121 applies to individual islands, not to archipelagic states constituted wholly
by groups of islands that are geographically, economically and politically interconnected. The
latter come under the scope of Article 46 of UNCLOS.).
12. Article 10(1) of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention provided that "An island is a
naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high-tide. . ." U.N.
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1958 Territorial Sea Convention),
Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. In its commentary on this article, the International Law
Commission noted that low-tide elevations and technical installations built on the seabed, such
as installations for the exploitation of the continental shelf, were not considered islands. Report
of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Eighth Session, 2 Y.B. OF THE INT'L L.
COMM'N 253, 270 (1956).
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA,
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excludes such offshore features as low-tide elevations and drying reefs, which
are dealt with in Article 13 of UNCLOS.'3
Paragraph 2 of Article 121 of UNCLOS reaffirms the customary position
of international law that islands can generate the same range of maritime
zones as any other land territory and that these zones, namely the territorial
sea, EEZ, and continental shelf are to be delimited in accordance to
UNCLOS in the same way as applicable to land territories.
Paragraph 3 forms the cornerstone of this Article providing an exception
to its preceding paragraphs. Paragraph 3 deprives "rocks which cannot
sustain human habitation or economic life of their own" of the capacity to
generate EEZs and continental shelf areas, but retains their ability to
generate a territorial sea and contiguous zone.' 4 In other words, any insular
feature satisfying the conditions of Article 121(1), namely natural formation
and permanently above water at high tide, is primafacie entitled to generate
full maritime projections in accordance to UNCLOS. But if such feature
may be classified as "rock," its capacity to generate EEZ and continental
shelf must be ascertained at a second stage by examining the conditions set
forth in Article 121(3), "human habitation" and "economic viability."15
Interestingly, while Article 121(3) of UNCLOS draws a distinction
between "islands" with full zone-generative capacity and "rocks" limited to a
territorial sea, the term "rock" and the phrase "cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own" receive no further definition.16
This interpretative loophole has given rise to considerable uncertainty,
particularly in cases where certain geographical features lie at the borderline
between an "island" and a "rock." In the case under examination, this is the
primary question one has to answer before discussing the possible effect of
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the maritime boundary delimitation between
China and Japan.
Before applying Article 121(3) to the Senkaku/Diaoyu island group, the
substantial content of this provision must be determined. The starting point
in this regard is Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1969 Vienna Convention).17 This states that "a treaty should be
interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose." Article 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention sets out the
supplementary means of interpretation, namely, the preparatory works of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.1s
13. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 13.
14. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 121.
15. Id.
16. Lewis M. Alexander, The Identification of TechnicalIssues of Maritime Boundary Delimitation
within the LOSC Context, in THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: IMPACT AND
IMPLEMENTATION 273-4 (E.D. Brown & R.R. Churchill eds., 1987).
17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, No. 18232, 1155 U.N.T.S.
332.
18. Id.
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What is the Meaning of the Term "Rock"?

From the construction of Article 121 of UNCLOS, it can be safely
suggested that a rock is a peculiar sub-category of island.'1 Strictly speaking,
there is no substantial difference between a "rock" and an "island" insofar as
they must both constitute "an area of land," "naturally formed," "surrounded
by water," and "above water at high tide."20 Nonetheless, under UNCLOS,
rocks are much more disadvantaged than islands since their zone-generative
capacity is substantially reduced.21
UNCLOS does not provide a definition of the term "rock."22 Assuming
that ordinary definitions of rock apply, this may lead to ambiguities
regarding the true meaning of the term "rock" and its distinction from other
maritime features.23 For example, the Cambridge English Dictionary
provides that rocks form "the dry solid part of the earth's surface or any
large piece of this that sticks up out of the ground or the sea."24 Webster's
Third New International Dictionary defines rock as, "a mass of stone lying
at or near the surface of the water."25 But these descriptions may also hold
true for other offshore geographical features, such as islands, which are
treated differently under UNCLOS.26 Vice versa, to be considered a "rock,"
in a legal sense, it is not always necessary that an offshore feature constitutes
a rock in a geological sense. Article 121(3) can also apply to a formation
consisting of sand. Therefore, in the interest of clarity and consistency, it
seems reasonable to seek the actual content of the term "rock," not in its
strict dictionary definition, but in the meaning which UNCLOS drafters
intended to confer in light of the Convention's objective and purpose.
From the Second Session of UNCLOS m, held in Caracas in 1974, the
general perception among states was that islands should be allowed the same
treatment in terms of ocean space as continents.27 According to some
delegations, an island's maritime space should be determined according to
19. Jon M. Van Dyke et al., The Exclusive Economic Zone of the Northwestern HawaiianIslands:
When Do UninhabitedIslands Generate an EEZ?, 25 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 425, 435 (1988).
20. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 121.
21. Chris M. Carleton & Clive Schofield, Developments in the Technical Determination of
Maritime Space: Delimitation, Dispute Resolution, GeographicalInformation System and the Role of the
Technical Expert 3(4) INT'L BoUNDARIEs RESEARCH UNIT:

MIARTME

BRIEFING 35-36 (2002);

Clive Schofield, supra note 7, at 25.
22. Alexander, supra note 16.
23. Alex G. Oude Elferink, ClarifingArticle 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: The Limits
Set by the Nature of International Legal Processes, 2 INr'L BOUNDARIEs RESEARCH UNrI:
BOUNDARY & SECURITY BULLETIN 58, 59 (1998).
24. Definition of Rock, CAMBRIDGE ENGLISH DicToNARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/
us/dictionary/english/rock.
25. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(Philip B. Gove ed., 1993).
26. For example, Cotter defines islands as "relatively small fragments of land." CHARLES H.
COTrER, THE PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE OCEANS 59 (1965).
27. U.N. SCOR, 2nd Sess., 40th mtg. at 286-7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.40 (Aug. 14,
1974).
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criteria equal to those used for continental landmasses.28 Further, many
states held the view that allowing islands to generate full seaward projections
was vital to safeguard the interests of their inhabitants which "entirely
depend upon the natural resources of the sea for the livelihood."29 The
statement of Cyprus is noteworthy in that regard:
Islands are mutatis mutandis in the same tradition as continental
territories insofar as rights and obligations under international law are
concerned, and that if any discrimination were to be made, it should be
in favor of, not at the expenses of, islands which rely on the resources in
their maritime zones. 30

'

Three far more intriguing issues were: (1) the distinction between islands
and other insular formations, (2) their precise definition, and (3) their effect
in maritime boundary delimitation. Some states raised concerns regarding
the "vagueness and generalized nature" of the existing definition of islands
contained in Article 10 of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention; particularly
whether this broad, generic, and somehow enigmatic definition could mean
that even minor rocks and seabed elevations would qualify as islands in a
legal sense.3
In response to the much-criticized 1958 Territorial Sea Convention's
definition, Romania submitted a proposal submitted that attempted to
differentiate islands from other geographical formations similar to islets.32
Paragraph 2 of the Romanian proposal read as follows:
An island similar to an islet is a naturally formed elevation of land (or
simply and eminence of the seabed) surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide and which is more than one square kilometer
but less than (. . .) square kilometers in area, which is not or cannot be
inhabited (permanently) or which does not or cannot have its own
economic life.33
28. See Statements of New Zealand, West Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago and Fiji and Greece at
the 21st, 38th and 39th meetings of the Second Committee, emphasizing the equitable
treatment of island states and islands, generally, and to their entitlement to the same territorial
sea and economic zone to be fixed for other land territory. U.N. SCOR, 2nd Sess., 21st mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.21 (July 31, 1974); see also U.N. SCOR, 2nd Sess., 38th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.38 (Aug. 13, 1974); U.N. SCOR 2nd Sess., 39th mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.39 (Aug. 14, 1974).
29. See Denmark's and Greece's Statements at the 39th Meeting of the Second Committee.
U.N. SCOR 2nd Sess., 39th mtg. at 285, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.39 (Aug. 14, 1974).
30. See Statement of Cyprus at the 20th Meeting of the Second Committee. U.N. SCOR 2nd
Sess., 20th mtg. at 163-4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.20 (July 30, 1974).
31. Clive Symmons, THE MARIrrME ZoN-s OF ISIANS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1979);
see Statements of Tunisia, Colombia and Spain at the 39th and 40th Meetings of the Second
Committee. U.N. SCOR 2nd Sess., 39th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.39 (Aug. 14,
1974); U.N. SCOR 2nd Sess., 40th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.40 (Aug. 14, 1974).
32. Romania: Draft Articles on Definition of and Regime Applicable to Islets and Islands Similar to
Islets, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.53 (Aug. 12, 1974).
33. Id.
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This trend was further advanced by the draft articles of delegations from
Algeria, Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, Upper Volta and
Zambia, which sought to define various categories of insular features such as
"islands," "islets," "rocks" and "low-tide elevations."34 Their proposals
advocated the use of specific criteria such as size, geographical, geological
and geomorphological configuration, needs and interests of island
population and the living conditions thereof. By contrast, a number of
delegations opposed the above proposals and reiterated their support for the
applicability of the 1958 Convention's definition.35
The resulting composite text, as emerged from the second session of
UNCLOS m, was a combination of the alternative definitions put forth by
the delegates during the discussions. The composite text read as follows:
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide;
2. An islet is a naturally formed area of land less than (. . .) square
kilometers, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide;
3. A rock is a naturally formed rocky elevation normally unfit for
human habitation which is surrounded by water and is above water at
high tide.
Following further refinements, the third session of UNCLOS III, held in
Geneva in 1975, led to Article 121 of UNCLOS 1982 as appears in the
present. This defines islands largely in the same terms as in the 1958
Convention.36 Only 121(3) reflects, to some extent, proposals for
differentiating islands from some other types of insular features, i.e. rocks.
In part, this is because of the serious practicalities of finding an alternative
definition for islands and commonly acceptable distinctions among different
types of islands.37 Largely, however, it is due to the realization that by
attempting to add detailed rules and complex formulae, such as those based
on size and population analogies,38 there would inevitably be artificial
34. Algeria, Dahomey, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, Upper Volta and Zambia: DraftArticles on the Regime of Islands, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.62/Rev.1 (Aug. 27, 1974).
35. See Fiji, New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa: Draft Articles on Islands, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.2/L.30 (July 30, 1974); see also Statements of Singapore, Canada, Denmark and
Trinidad and Tobago at the 39th Meeting of the Second Committee. U.N. SCOR 2nd Sess.,
39th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.39 (Aug. 14, 1974).
36. Informal Single Negotiating Text, Part II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/VP.8/PartlI (Dec. 10,
1982).
37. U.N. SCOR 2nd Sess., 40th mtg. at 287-8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.40 (Aug. 14,
1974).
38. For example, Ireland's draft proposal stated,". . account may be taken of an island only if
it is inhabited and if.. it contains at least one tenth of the land area and population of the State
concerned." Ireland: Draft Article on Delimitation of Areas of Continental Shelf Between
Neighbouring States U.N. Doc A/CONF.62/C.2/L.43 (Aug. 6, 1974).
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ambiguities, resulting in the "very inequity which they purported to avoid."39
As one commentator observed, "the majority of these proposals were simply
sophisticated attempts to protect national interests, and thus, despite the
superficial appeal of this approach, the absence of any reference to these
characteristics of islands.. .comes as no surprise."40 Therefore, proposals to
draw distinctions between islands, rocks and other insular features based on
certain size criteria, fixed population analogies and other geographical
factors, were considered incredibly complex, and as a consequence, were
explicitly ruled out. But the introduction of 121(3) indicates a common
understanding that emerged during the discussions, that in situations where
offshore natural resources were vital to the economy of the coastal state and
the livelihood of the islands' inhabitants, such islands would be entitled to
full maritime zones. Inversely, small, uninhabitable maritime features
without any economic life should be excluded from such generating capacity.
IV.

"Human Habitation" or "Economic Life of Its Own"

At present, Article 121(3) of UNCLOS stipulates two crucial conditions
for an insular feature to qualify as "island": to sustain "human habitation" or
"economic life of its own."41 The inclusion of the grammatical conjunction

"or" suggests that these two conditions are non-cumulative, meaning that
the fulfillment of just one of these conditions is sufficient to prove that an
insular feature has full zone-generative capacity.42 Arguably, Article 121(3)
gives rise to several questions of interpretation. How can one say with any
certainty whether a rock is capable of sustaining human habitation or has the
capacity to generate economic life of its own? More importantly, can there
be a category of island, in a legal sense, that can have economic life of its
own but cannot sustain human habitation, or vice versa? Finally, would an
island that had once been inhabited, but has become uninhabited over time
due to persisting adverse economic conditions, for example, be deprived of
its legal status?

In answering these questions, it is necessary to point out that Article
121(3) refers to the capacity of sustaining human habitation, not simply
actual habitation. Capacity for habitation is arguably a broader condition
than actual habitation.43 This suggests that an island must not necessarily
be, or have once been, inhabited to be considered as such. The key is to
prove the island's ability to sustain habitation. Clearly, the first step to prove
this ability is to look at the island's present or past population. Even though
39. Statement of the United Kingdom at the 40th Meeting of the Second Committee. U.N.
SCOR 2nd Sess., 40th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.40 (Aug. 14, 1974).
40. Donald E. Karl, Islands and the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf: A Framework for
Analysis, 71 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 642, 645 (1977).
41. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 121.
42. Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred H.A. Soons, Entitlement to Maritime Areas of Rocks
which Cannot Sustain Human Habitation or Economic Life of Their Own, 21 NETH. Y.B. OF
INT'L L. 139, 163-165 (1990).
43. Clive Symmons, TiHE MAmTDWE ZONES OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 49 (1979).
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it is not necessary for an island to actually be or have at some point been
inhabited to meet the "sustain human habitation" condition, it will certainly
be easier to argue that an island can actually sustain human habitation if it
had once been inhabited. In addition, the fact that the given population has
historically made use of the surrounding waters, e.g. for fishing or mining,
may be used to establish the island's legal status.Assuming that there are no solid indications that the island is, or used to
be, inhabited, the second step is to examine the island's capacity to sustain
human habitation. In that regard, the most vital needs for human survival
are arguably food, fresh water, and shelter. Therefore, it may be suggested
that the existence of cultivable soil, fresh water and enough space for shelter
are the three most critical features of an island that has the ability to sustain
human life.
The second requirement provided in Article 121(3) concerns the island's
capacity to "sustain economic life of its own." Similar to the first
requirement, the phrase "able to sustain" suggests that the existence of
economic life is not necessary, but rather it is the presence of resources that
can sustain such economic life that is crucial to qualify as an island. Be that
as it may, it is submitted that if natural resources such as fisheries or minerals
are known to be present on the island, this alone is enough to reach the
threshold of Article 121(3). This view finds some support in the judgement
of the Supreme Court of Norway in Public Prosecutor v. Haraldson et al.,45
where it was held that Abel island, an outlying island in the northeastern part
of Svalbard archipelago, was not an uninhabitable rock within the meaning
of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS because it was able to support a significant
polar bear hunt, notwithstanding that hunting was prohibited for
conservation reasons.- The existence of physical opportunities on the
feature for sustaining some kind of economic life, such as hunting, were
considered enough to grant the feature the legal status of an island. It
should also be noted that teams of meteorologists and scientists living on the
island did not qualify as a stable population.47 Further, the phrase "of its
own" indicates that the island itself must be capable of generating a source
for economic life. But nowhere in the discussions that took place at
was it mentioned that islands must be self-sufficient. As a
UNCLOS
matter of fact, it would not always be possible for a state, whether
continental or island, to achieve self-sufficiency at every level, whether

m

44. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.CJ. Rep. 116, 127-142. (It is interesting
to note that in the FisheriesCase of 1951, Norway contended that waters adjacent to the coastal
zone of the various insular formations (known as fjords) were essential to the livelihood of their
inhabitants. The Court acknowledged this and granted Norway full jurisdiction to extensive
fisheries zones measured from straight baselines connecting all the aforementioned features.).
45. Robin R. Churchill, Norway: Supreme CourtJudgment on Law of the Sea Issues, 11(4) INT'LJ.
OF 1AuuNE AND CoASTAL L. 576 (1996) (citing Public Prosecutor v. Haraldson et al.,
Judgment, 1996).
46. Id. at 579.
47. Id.

356

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 50, NO. 2

analyzed from the perspective of the economy, energy, food or agriculture.
Some external support to fully realize the economic potential of an island
must be deemed permissible to that end.
State practice and jurisprudence on the issue of an island have been
remarkably unhelpful. International courts and tribunals have failed to offer
a decisive and authoritative definition of Article 121 of UNCLOS.48 This is
largely because in boundary cases involving islands, international courts and
tribunals have tended to focus on issues relevant to drawing the delimitation
lines rather than specifically interpreting the legal status of the offshore
features in question.49
In the Volga Case,50 concerning the release of the Russian-flagged fishing
vessel, Volga, which was apprehended by the Australian Navy for illegally
fishing in the Australian EEZ adjacent to Heard and McDonald islands,
Judge Vukas raised serious doubts as to the appropriateness of establishing
EEZ off the shores of "uninhabitable and uninhabited" islands. In his
separate declaration, he explained that a crucial factor for establishing an
EEZ was the protection of the economic interests of the coastal states, and
particularly of their coastal population. He then went further to observe
that these economic interests did not exist with respect to uninhabited
islands, such as Heard and McDonald islands, as they had no "coastal fishing
communities" and "no permanent habitation."s' But it is important to note
that neither Russia nor any other member of the Tribunal had challenged
Australia's right to claim an EEZ around Heard and McDonald islands.52 It
is also interesting to note that this reasoning would imply that actual human
habitation and economic life must be recorded cumulatively to meet the test
of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS. This, however, runs contrary to the wording
of said article, particularly the grammatical conjunction "or" between
"human habitation" and "economic life" and the phrase "able to sustain" as
opposed to actual habitation and economic life.53 The authoritative value of
Judge Vukas' independent statement and its potential impact on future case
law regarding the issue remains to be seen.
The preceding section has examined the meaning of Article 121 of
UNCLOS in light of its negotiating history and the ordinary interpretation
48. Schofield, supra note 7, at 28.
49. See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. Rep. 61,
9] 184-188. (The Court omitted to respond to the contentions of the parties regarding the status
of Serpents' Island under Article 121 of UNCLOS, but instead simply observed that Serpents'
Island was entitled to a l2nm territorial Sea and it had no impact on the maritime delimitation
between the two states.).
50. The "Volga" Case (Russ. Fed'n v. Austl), Judgment, (Dec. 23, 2002), availableat www.itlos
.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case.no1 1/1 1judgment-231202_en.pdf.
51. Id.
52. It is noteworthy that Australia enforces its EEZ regime due to Japanese whaling in the
area. See Marko Milanovic, ICJ Decides the Whaling in the Antarctic Case: Australia Wins, EJIL:
TALK! BLOG OF THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (June 7, 2016), www
.ejiltalk.org/icj-decides-the-whaling-in-the-antarctic-case-australia-wins/.
53. UNCLOS, supra note 10, art. 121(3).
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of its terms with regard to its objective and purpose. The following section
applies the above analysis to the case of the seven Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in
the East China Sea.
V.

Senkaku/Diaoyu: Are They Islands?

The Senkaku/Diaoyu island group consists of seven insular features, all of
54
which have a dry surface permanently above water. Only three features are
but the rest are totally
trees,
covered by some vegetation, mostly palm
small, with the largest
extremely
are
they
that
barren.ss Despite the fact
island being only about one square kilometer in size, all seem to satisfy the
conditions set forth in Article 121(1) of UNCLOS, being naturally formed
areas of land permanently above water at high tide.56 On the other hand, it
is not entirely clear as to whether they can escape the conditions defined in
Article 121(3) of UNCLOS due to the requirement of being able to support
human life or economic activities of their own.s"

Though there have been some reports of people living periodically on the
larger island of the group, Uotsurijima/Diaoyu Dao, for example, civilians
processing bonito caught in the surrounding waters or fishermen finding
shelter during storms, it is highly doubtful that any of the Senkaku/Diaoyu
has ever been permanently inhabited, a fact which may indicate their
incapacity to sustain stable human habitation. Furthermore, as illustrated by
the preparatory works of UNCLOS m, the requirement of human
habitation cannot be met solely by the infrequent presence of fishermen or
other civilians on the islands.58 According to the above-mentioned findings,
the human habitability "criterion may not inevitably require that the insular
feature itself be permanently inhabited, but would require, at a minimum,
that it provide support for a nearby stable community of persons"59 or "stable
residence of organized human groups."60 While "[i]nfrequent visits from
interested scientists would not constitute a stable community. . . [h]istoric use
of the island as a basis for the purpose of harvesting 'the surrounding waters
could, however, provide a good indication"' of its capacity to generate full
maritime projections.61

Indeed,

as noted above, if the rationale for

attributing extended zones of maritime jurisdiction to islands were to protect
the interests of their local communities which are dependent on the
exploitation of the area and the surrounding waters, extended maritime
zones should not be accorded to islands that lack such stable community of
residents.
54. J.R.V. Prescott, Maritime Jurisdiction in East Asian Seas, EAST-WEST ENV'T AND POL'Y
INST., 52 (1987).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Douglas M. Johnson & Mark J. Valencia, Pacific Ocean Boundary Problems 80 (1991).
See UNCLOS, supra note 10, art 121.
See id.
See id.
Van Dyke et al., supra note 19, at 437.
Id. at 436, n. 62.
Id. at 438.
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Nonetheless, despite the absence of stable human habitation on a given
island, its intrinsic capacity to sustain human life should not be totally
excluded. In order, however, to prove such capacity, it is crucial to
demonstrate the presence of other factors on the island, such as fresh water,
cultivable soil, and enough space to build shelter. In that regard, while some
vegetation is reported on the larger island of the group, it seems doubtful
that any of them has cultivable soil to enable the production of food to
sustain permanent human habitation.62 Further, none of the Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands seem to have readily accessible fresh water. 63 Hence, if
Senkaku/Diaoyu are deemed to be totally dependent for food and water and
every other human need, they can hardly meet the requirement of being able
to sustain human habitation.
The next and perhaps more complicated question is whether the Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands satisfy the other requirement stipulated in Article 121(3)
UNCLOS, namely, to be capable to "sustain human habitation or economic
life of their own."64 Would fishing and production of oil from the
surrounding waters meet this requirement? The fish stocks in the Senkaku/
Diaoyu area are reportedly very significant.6s The same holds true for
hydrocarbon resources in the surrounding seabed.66 As a consequence, it can
be reasonably assumed that the area could potentially sustain economic life if
the surrounding seabed and superjacent waters were to be commercially
exploited.
The question that then arises is whether this form of economic life could
be considered to be generated by the island "of [its] own" or if the island
plays only a minor role in such economic activities.67 To that end, some
commentators have asked whether it is sufficient for uninhabited islands,
such as the islands in question, to have enough strategic economic value due
to their adjacency to valuable seabed resources, even if they have to import
food and supplies from external sources. 68 In other words, can a tiny,
isolated and uninhabitable feature be considered an island simply due to the
fact that vast amounts of commercially exploitable hydrocarbon resources
are known or suspected to be present in its proximity? Charney suggested
that even if economic viability has to be realized by some kind of external
support, it should be regarded as satisfying the test.69 He also believed that
resources such as hydrocarbons in the adjacent seabed could be included in
62. Johnson & Valencia, supra note 55.
63. Id.
64. See UNCLOS, supra note 10.
65. How UninhabitedIslandsSoured China-JapanTies, BBC NEws (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www
.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-1 1341139
66. Jonathan I. Charney, Central East Asian Maritime Boundariesand the Law of the Sea, 89(4)
AM. J. Iwr'L L. 724, 733-34 (1995).
67. See UNCLOS, supra note 10.
68. 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: The Limits Set by the Nature of InternationalLegal
Processes, 2 IIBRU 58, 60-64 (1998); see also Carleton & Schofield supra note 21.
69. Charney, supra note 66.
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the calculation if the rock is, or has the resources necessary for use as, an
economically viable base for operations.70
If it is accepted that hydrocarbon resources can justify the requirement of
"sustaining economic life," this means that a barren rock could potentially
qualify as an island, thus unlocking a marginally bigger maritime space
7
simply due to the proven or plausible presence of such resources. 1 But
simply imagine the legal implications if the said hydrocarbons prove to be of
lesser quantity or quality than initially expected, hence failing the "economic
life" test. Could it ever be admissible, under international law, that the legal
status of an insular formation, and the associated maritime entitlements,
could be determined solely on the basis of the commercial success, or
otherwise, of the resources to which the feature is believed to be adjacent?
International courts and arbitral tribunals have consistently rejected the
relevance of purely economic factors, such as oil exploration and
exploitation, in the context of assigning maritime entitlements between
72
disputing states. In the Tunisia v. Libya case, the ICJ rejected the Tunisian
mineral resources that Libya
same
to
the
of
access
arguments about its lack
may change over time.73
that
as
"variables"
them
considering
secure,
could
It went on to say that "[a] country might be poor today and become rich
tomorrow as a result of an event such as the discovery of a valuable economic
resource."74 The Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Tribunal concluded that pure
economic factors could not be taken into account because they relate to
uncertain and changing factors and they are not thus "permanent
76
circumstances."7s Likewise, in the Bahrain v. Qatar case, the ICJ held that
it did "not consider the existence of pearling banks, though predominantly
exploited in the past by Bahrain fishermen, as forming a circumstance which
would justify an eastward shifting of the equidistance line as requested by
Bahrain."77 In the Libya/Malta case,78 though it was recognized that natural
resources of the continental shelf "so far as known or readily ascertainable
might well constitute relevant circumstances which it would be reasonable to
take into account in a delimitation," the Court refrained from taking such
factor into account. 79 Finally, in the Jan Mayen case, the ICJ found that Jan
Mayen was clearly an island, notwithstanding the absence of locally based
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libya Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18 T 107 (Feb.
1982).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Roberty F. Pietrowski, Jr., Guinea/Guinea-Bissau:Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary, 25(2) I.L.M. 251, 302 ¶ 122 (1986).
76. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, 2001
I.CJ. 40 ¶ 236 (Mar. 2001).
77. Id.
78. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13 $ 58 (June
1985).
79. Id.
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fishing operations and the limited size of its population.8o It noted "the
attribution of maritime areas to the territory of a State, which, by its nature,
is destined to be permanent, is a legal process based solely on the possession
by the territory concerned of a coastline."81 Therefore the size of the
population and other socio-economic factors should not be taken into
account.
Interestingly, at the time of writing the present paper, an Arbitral
Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS, delivered a historic
verdict on the maritime dispute between the Philippines and China in the
South China Sea.82 As it turns out, this is the first time in the history of
international adjudication that an international arbitral Tribunal has ever
sought to determine the status of several maritime features in the South
China Sea within the meaning of Article 121 of UNCLOS. While a detailed
analysis of the Tribunal's 500-page verdict lies beyond the scope of this
paper, it is nonetheless to crucial to address the key elements of the
Tribunal's authoritative interpretation and application of Article 121 of
UNCLOS to the South China Sea insular features.
The Tribunal commenced its analysis by noting that Article 121 of
UNCLOS had not previously been the subject of significant consideration
by courts or arbitral tribunals and that the scope of application of its
paragraph 3 was not clearly established.83 Therefore, the Tribunal
considered it appropriate to examine the meaning of this provision by
separately reviewing the text, its context, the object and purpose of this
provision, pursuant to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.84 Having done so, it went on to establish some key findings
with important practical implications for the future interpretation and
application of Article 121 of UNCLOS. In the words of the Tribunal:
(a) First, the use of the term "rock" does not require that a feature be
composed of rock in the geologic sense in order to fall within the scope
of the provision.
(b) Second, the use of the term "cannot" makes clear that the provision
concerns the objective capacity of the feature to sustain human
habitation or economic life. Actual habitation or economic activity at
any particular point in time is not relevant, except to the extent that it
indicates the capacity of the feature.
(c) Third, the use of the term "sustain" indicates both time and
qualitative elements. Habitation and economic life must be able to
extend over a certain duration and occur to an adequate standard.
80. Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen, (Denmark v.
Norway), Judgment, 1993 I.CJ. 38 1 80 (June 1993).
81. Id.
82. See South China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China), Award, 2016 PCA Case Repository
(Perm. Ct. Arb. July 2016).
83. Id. [ 474.
84. Id. 1 476.
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(d) Fourth, the logical interpretation of the use of the term "or"
discussed above indicates that a feature that is able to sustain either
human habitation or an economic life of its own will be entitled to an
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.85
In addition to the above, the Tribunal observed that a rock cannot be
transformed into a fully-entitled island through human efforts, e.g. through
land modification, and generally by the introduction of technology and
extraneous materials intended to increase its capacity to sustain human
86
habitation or economic life of its own. According to the Tribunal, the
phrase "cannot sustain" means "cannot, without artificial addition, sustain."87
Key here is the status of a feature in its natural condition. Moreover, as
regards the term "human habitation," the Tribunal noted that this should be
understood to involve "a stable community of people for whom the feature
constitutes a home and on which they can remain," regardless of the size of
this community.88 As far as the "economic life" criterion is concerned, the
court made the notable observation that any economic activity should
revolve around the feature itself and not focus exclusively on the adjacent
waters or seabed.89 To that end, any economic activity that is entirely
dependent on external support or exclusively devoted to using a feature as an
object for extractive activities, e.g. as an oil or fishing platform, without the
involvement of a local island population cannot reasonably be considered to
constitute the economic life of an island as its own.90
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Tribunal found that the
capacity of a feature to sustain human habitation or economic life of its own
must be addressed on a case-by-case basis, having regard to the principal
factors indicating the natural capacity of any given feature to sustain human
habitation and economic life. These may include, inter alia, "the presence of
water, food, and shelter in sufficient quantities to enable a group of persons
to live on the feature for an indeterminate period of time."91 But, the
Tribunal went to great lengths to emphasize that no "abstract test" of
assessing these physical requirements can or should be formulated and that
the relative contribution of these factors to the natural capacity of a feature

85. Id. 1% 504, 539-42.
86. Id. 1 559.
87. Id. 91 508-10.
88. Id. 9 542. (In remote features, a few individuals or even periodic habitation by nomadic
people could well suffice.).
89. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 82 1 500.
90. Id. %417, 543; see also id. %547 ("A feature that is only capable of sustaining habitation
through the continued delivery of supplies from outside does not meet the requirements of
Article 121(3). Nor does economic activity that remains entirely dependent on external
resources or that is devoted to using a feature as an object for extractive activities, without the
involvement of a local population, constitute a feature's 'own' economic life.").
91. Id. 1 546.
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will vary from one case to another.92 If for example, an insular "feature is
entirely barren of vegetation" and lacks indigenous freshwater resources and
all other sources necessary for basic survival, it will be undisputedly
incapable of sustaining human habitation.93 On the other hand, the Tribunal
acknowledged that it is not always possible to determine, just by looking at
the physical characteristics of a feature, "where the capacity merely to keep
people alive ends and the capacity to sustain settled habitation by a human
community begins."94
Having reached the above conclusions, the Tribunal went on to apply its
findings to the various features that were the subject of the Philippines'
submission.9s It found that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron
Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven Reef, and McKennan Reef were all "rocks" in
the meaning of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS.96 The evidentiary basis for this
conclusion was that none of these features could sustain human habitation in
their natural state because they had no fresh water, vegetation, or living
space, despite the fact that some states, such as China, had constructed
installations, deployed military personnel, and engaged in significant
reclamation work on several of these features.97 Concerning the application
of Article 121 to the disputed Spratly island group, the Tribunal, having
recognized that most of these features had been significantly modified from
their natural condition with land reclamation, construction of installations
etc., it then undertook the herculean task to assess various sources of
historical evidence of conditions on the said features, prior to advent of
human modification.98 These conditions included the presence of portable
fresh water, 99 vegetation,'oo soil and agriculture,oi historical habitation by
fishermen,102 and commercial operations.103 On the basis of this analysis, the
Tribunal reached a groundbreaking conclusion, that the principal high-tide
features in the Spratly islands are in fact "capable of enabling the survival of
small groups of people" in the light of their physical characteristics.o4 But
the Tribunal denied their "capacity of a feature to sustain human habitation"
on the basis that: a) no stable human community had ever formed on the
92. Id. (In the tribunal's words, "human habitation entails more than the mere survival of
humans on a feature and that economic life entails more than the presence of resources.").

93. Id. 1 548.
94. Id.
95. Id. 1¶ 554-70.
96. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 82
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Spratly islands;105 and that, in the absence of such community b) all
economic activities in the Spratly were aimed at utilizing the surrounding
resources for the benefit of the populations of Hainan, Formosa, Japan, the
Philippines and Viet Nam, not the features' local community itself.-o6 As a
result, the Tribunal found that "none of the high-tide features in the Spratly
Islands, in their natural condition, are capable of sustaining human
habitation or economic life of their own."107 Therefore, under Article 121(3)
none of these features could generate "exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf' areas. 08

VI.

Conclusory Remarks

The application of UNCLOS provisions to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands raises several important issues. First and foremost, it is not
altogether clear whether these features can be classified as islands in a legal
sense. The general assumption is that none of the features would be capable
of sustaining human habitation or economic life of their own; being
minuscule, with no natural source of water and very limited vegetation. But
any attempt to precisely define the conditions stipulated in Article 121(3) of
UNCLOS, namely human habitability and economic sustainability, and
their application to Senkaku/Diaoyu, must, inevitably, involve a discussion
on the functions of technology and economics.o By way of example, the
reported lack of fresh water on the islands can be immediately overcome
through the use of seawater desalination technologies which are increasingly
used by states and private corporations to produce fresh water suitable for
human consumption or irrigation in places where fresh water is very limited
or absent.11o In addition, rainwater harvesting technologies may be used to
collect, store, and conserve fresh water in places where there is no surface
water or where groundwater is inaccessible or unfit to drink.", Moreover, in
relation to the reported absence of cultivable soil on the Senkaku/Diaoyu,
greenhouse structures are also well known for their ability to effectively
bypass shortcomings in the quality of the soil or poor weather conditions

.

105. See Id. 1 546; see also id.¶ 618 ("For the Tribunal, the criterion of human habitation is not
met by the temporary inhabitation of the Spratly Islands by fishermen, even for extended
periods."); see also id. T 620 ("[M]ilitary or other governmental personnel presently stationed on
the features in the Spratly Islands by one or another of the littoral States suffice to constitute
'human habitation' for the purposes of Article 121(3).").
106. Id. TT 622-23.
107. Id. T 1203(B)(7)(a).
108. Id. T 626.
109. Carleton & Schofield, supra note 21.
110. Processand Optimization of the SeawaterDesalinationPlant, CONSULAQUA HAMBURG, http://
www.consulaqua.de/projekte-detaillitems/41.htmil (last visited Oct. 14, 2016); see also Alili D.
Khawaji, Ibrahum K. Kutubkhanah & Jong-Mihn Wie, Advances in Seawater Desalination
Technologies, 221 DESALINATION 47 (2008).
111. Rainwater Harvesting, WATER AID (Jan. 2013), www.wateraid.org/-/media/Publications/
Rainwater-harvesting.pdf
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and can thereby enable the harvesting of crops or plants even in marginal
environments.1 12 Ultimately, how can one argue with certainty that an
offshore feature cannot ever be inhabited in an age when technology has
made it theoretically possible to sustain human life in space stations on
Mars?113

As reasonable as the above questions may seem, the phrase "of their own"
may be employed to filter down this interpretation in that an island has to,
by itself, be able to sustain the inhabitation by providing, at the very least,
the basic conditions for inhabitation namely fresh water, cultivable soil, and
space to build shelter.114 This was, in fact, one of the central findings of the
Tribunal in the South China Sea case as briefly noted above. It is true that
any attempt to create an artificial situation by helping a certain feature to
sustain human habitation or economic life would certainly fall short of
meeting the requirement of human habitability and economic sustainability
stipulated in UNCLOS."s
Taken in the round, though it is not possible to draw a definitive
conclusion, it is nonetheless highly doubtful that a court would find any of
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands capable of sustaining human habitation or
economic life of their own. In fact, given the lack of solid evidence of
human habitability and economic sustainability or viability of the said
features, it would seem contrary to the intention of UNCLOS drafters if
these isolated maritime formations would ever be accorded the same
maritime zones as larger inhabited islands or continental territories. But an
argument can certainly be made that, notwithstanding the most recent South
China Sea Award, there has been no absolute rule or consensus on how
Article 121(3) of UNCLOS is to be interpreted and applied.116
Even more so, there is no prescribed method of ascertaining how islands
could affect the delimitation of maritime boundaries. Though an island is
legally entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf of its own, it is not
altogether clear whether it will be accorded a full effect in maritime
boundary delimitation. Indeed, it is not unusual in state practice and
jurisprudence for proper islands to be granted a significantly reduced effect
when delimiting the maritime boundary between islands and larger mainland
112. 10 Greenhouse Gardening Benefits, SUNDAY GARDENER, http://www.sundaygardener.net/
10-greenhouse-gardening-benefits/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
113. You Can Eat Vegetables from Mars, Say Scientists after Crop Experiment, THE GuARDIN
(June 23, 2016), www.theguardian.com/science/2016/jun/24/you-can-eat-vegetables-frommars-say-scientists-after-crop-experim.
114. See UNCLOS, supra note 10.
115. South China Sea Arbitration, supra note 82 1[522-525.
116. Brice M. Clagett, Competing Claims of Vietnam and China in the Vanguard Bank and Blue
Dragon Areas of the South China Sea: Part II, 13 OIL AND GAS L. AND TAX'N REv. 419, 420
(1995)1 see also Alex G. Oude Elferink, Clarifing Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention:
The Limits Set by the Nature of International Legal Processes, 2 IBRU 58, 64 (1998); Barbara
Kwiatkowska & Alfred HA Soons, Entitlement to Maritime Areas of Rocks which Cannot Sustain
Human Habitation or Economic Life of their Own, NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 176
(1990); Van Dyke, supra note 19, at 425, 439, 463.
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coasts. In several cases, tiny and geographically isolated islands were
disallowed from generating any areas of ocean space beyond their territorial
sea so as to avoid creating a "disparity or disproportion."117 Yet, in some
others, small and uninhabited islands managed to claim a significant
maritime space of continental shelf and fishery zone against a massive
opposing mainland.118 All in all, even if Senkaku/Diaoyu were to be found to
form islands in a legal sense, the impact of these features on future maritime
delimitation would still be rather uncertain.119 All these questions lie at the
heart of the Japan/China boundary disputes, and they are questions that
matter. After all, they have the potential to cause serious discord among
neighbours and act as a trigger for military confrontation.120

117. See Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen, (Denmark
v.Norway), Judgment, 1993 I.Cj. 38 ¶ 61-66 (June 1993); See also Maritime Delimitation and
Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment, 2001 I.CJ. 40 ¶ 246 (Mar. 2001); See also
Delimitation of the Maritime Areas (Canada v. France), 3 I.L.M. 1145, 1184 ¶18(1992).
118. Delimitation of the Maritime Areas, supra note 117 1143-52.
119. Nasu & Rothwell, supra note 4, at 76-77.
120. JapanSays Ties with China "Deteriorating"Over Disputed Islands, BBC NEws (Aug. 9,2016),
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37019028.

